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Abstract
Due to their flexible deployment and on-demand mobility, small-scale unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) are anticipated to be involved in widespread communication applications in the forthcoming fifth-
generation (5G) networks. However, the confidentiality of UAV communication applications is vulnerable
to security threats due to the broadcast nature and dominant line-of-sight (LoS) channel conditions, and
physical-layer security (PLS) technique can be applied for secrecy performance enhancement in such
a context. On the other hand, it is also promising to exploit UAVs to cooperatively protect secure
communications. This article provides an overview of the recent research efforts on UAV-involved
secure communications at the physical layer. We focus on the design of secure transmission schemes
according to different roles of UAVs and the optimization of introduced degrees of freedom (DoFs) by
the unique characteristics of UAVs. We also propose some future research directions on this topic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Equipped with various kinds of sensors and actuators like Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU),
range sensors (ultrasonic, infrared, laser), barometer, magnetometer, Global Position System
(GPS), cameras and visual systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are promising to support
a wide range of applications due to their characteristics of flexible deployment, low acquisition
and maintenance costs, high maneuverability and hovering ability [1]. Historically, UAVs have
been considered for military applications from the beginning to carry out some simple but
risky tasks, such as monitoring and attacking the hostile targets. Whereafter, further attentions
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2have been paid to applying small-scale UAVs for emerging civilian tasks, including aerial
photography, emergency search and rescue, resource exploration and cargo transport, etc. The
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has released the operational rules to guideline the
working definition of low-altitude small-scale UAVs with aircraft weight less than 55 pounds
and maximum altitude less than 400 feet above ground level. Whereafter, FAA has launched a
further national program, namely “Drone Integration Pilot Program”, to explore the expanded
use of UAVs. Motivated by their unique characteristics, UAVs have also been considered to
play an important role in the future communication systems [2]. On one hand, since UAVs are
generally exploited to carry out tasks at a relatively high altitude, the aerial-to-ground (A2G)
line-of-sight (LoS) channels are likely to provide channel superiority compared with ground
communication channels in cellular networks, which are significantly affected by severe fading
and shadowing effects. On the other hand, due to their on-demand mobility characteristic, UAVs
can be flexibly deployed which will introduce the new degrees of freedom (DoFs) with respect
to their positions. To facilitate efficient and reliable transmission, the established UAV-involved
communication links can be categorized as payload communication and control and non-payload
communication (CNPC), the specific requirements of which can be totally different and thus have
been specified by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) recently.
Due to the openness of wireless environment, the security and privacy of wireless commu-
nication applications are of utmost concern. Particularly, the confidentiality of UAV wireless
communications is more challenging to be protected under LoS propagations, which potentially
provide strong quality of A2G wiretap channels for the hostile. Therefore, effective methods are
urgently needed for secure UAV communications. Traditionally, the cryptography-based methods
are exploited to protect the confidentiality of secure communications by using shared secret keys.
However, the high mobility characteristic of UAVs makes the corresponding key management
and distribution more challenging. Besides, ultra-reliable and low-latency communication links
between UAVs and the associated ground control stations (GCSs) are required to support their
two-way on-demand control to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAVs. Therefore, the
cryptography-based methods are unsuitable due to the significant processing delay. In addition,
a general drawback of cryptography-based methods is that these methods are dependent on the
computational complexity, and thus the perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed. The methods will
be invalid if the hostile has powerful computing devices. Under this condition, physical-layer
security (PLS) has been proposed and developed as a key complementary technique for secure
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
3wireless communications [3]. The basic idea of PLS is to exploit the randomness characteristics
of wireless channels, which is key-less and thus promising for UAV secure communications
to overcome the aforementioned drawbacks. In addition, since secrecy performance is highly
dependent on the superiority of legitimate channels to wiretap channels, additional DoFs pro-
vided by the on-demand mobility of UAVs can be exploited to guarantee the expected channel
superiority and thus improve secrecy performance.
In such a context, UAV-involved physical-layer secure wireless communications has attracted
increasing interest in recent years. In general, they could be categorized as UAV-enabled secure
communications and UAV-aided secure cooperation, according to different roles of UAVs in
secure communications. Specifically, UAVs can be exploited as legitimate transceivers for the
former typical scenario to establish direct communication links, such as aerial base stations
providing temporary wireless connections for ground users or aerial terminals carrying on other
specific tasks, e.g. surveillance. While for the latter typical scenario, UAVs are exploited to enable
friendly relaying or jamming, so as to cooperatively enhance secrecy performance of secure
communications. Compared with the existing traditional PLS researches, the most significant
difference is that, extra security DoFs have been introduced in UAV wireless communica-
tions, inspired by the flexible deployment and on-demand mobility of UAVs. Especially, three-
dimensional (3D) deployment of static UAVs, and trajectory design of mobile UAVs, together
with transmit power can be jointly optimized for secrecy performance enhancement. Efficient
secure transmission schemes should be carefully designed and position/trajectory/power should
be optimized. However, a well-organized overview of recent research progress on this topic is
still absent as far as we know, which motivates this article.
The article is organized as follows. The typical application scenarios of UAV-involved secure
wireless communications as well as the main design considerations brought in by the mobility
of UAVs are introduced in Section II. Then, we focus on the recent research efforts on UAV-
involved secure communications under various typical application scenarios in Section III-Section
V. Finally in Section VI, we propose some future research directions on this topic.
II. TYPICAL APPLICATION SCENARIOS AND MAIN DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
As aforementioned above, the typical application scenarios can be essentially summarized as
UAV-enabled secure communications and UAV-aided secure cooperation according to different
roles of UAVs in secure communications. Furthermore, hybrid secure transmission scheme could
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
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Fig. 1. Specific applications for UAV-involved secure communications.
be obtained by combining the two typical application scenarios. Fig. 1 depicts the methodology
of UAV-involved secure communications.
For the first typical scenario, UAVs can be exploited as aerial base stations to potentially
provide temporary connectivity services for the area without cellular infrastructure coverage. It
may happen due to natural disasters in emergency situations, or data traffic offloading in the
hotspot area with densely-distributed users, etc. On the other hand, UAVs can also be exploited as
aerial terminals with their own missions such as aerial surveillance and video streaming. UAV
aerial terminals are under the control of associated GCSs through CNPC links for automatic
operation and are willing to establish data transmission links with ground base stations (GBSs)
for information exchange. In both cases, however, the confidentiality of UAV communications is
vulnerable to security threats of the hostile due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions.
As a result, enhancing the corresponding secrecy at the physical layer becomes critical for the
above application scenarios.
To further improve secrecy performance, UAV-aided secure cooperation is recognized as
another typical application scenario and can be generally categorized as UAV-enabled mobile
relaying and UAV-enabled friendly jamming. Due to their on-demand mobility, UAVs could be
deployed as mobile relays to enhance the superiority of legitimate channels in the dynamic
environment, and the dominant LoS conditions can also be exploited for UAV-enabled friendly
jamming to effectively degrade the quality of wiretap channels. As a result, both will improve
secrecy capacity according to the basic principles of PLS.
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5The most significant observation is that, new security DoFs, including 3D position design
of static UAVs and trajectory design of mobile UAVs, have been introduced by the on-demand
mobility characteristic of UAVs. Together with the traditional DoF, transmit power design, they
could be exploited jointly to enhance secrecy performance of UAV-involved transmission schemes
under different typical application scenarios. The corresponding issues on these aspects are
discussed in the following parts, respectively.
Under the secure communication scenarios involving static UAVs, the 3D position design will
significantly affect secrecy performance of secure transmissions. For a tractable analysis, the
optimal 3D position can be determined by jointly design of UAV horizontal position and flight
altitude. The design of horizontal position is related to the distributions of both legitimate users
and ground eavesdroppers. Intuitively, UAVs should be positioned horizontally close to legitimate
users and far away from potential eavesdroppers when providing communication services or
cooperative relaying, while in a reverse manner when providing friendly jamming. On the other
hand, with the increase of UAV flight height, the effect of large-scale path loss is enhanced while
the probability of the LoS path being blocked is reduced. Therefore, the optimal flight altitude
generally exists under different conditions.
Due to their on-demand mobility characteristic, the trajectory design of mobile UAVs is further
considered to be exploited for secure communications. It is expected to enhance the superiority
of legitimate channels to wiretap channels by proper trajectory design, which is beneficial to
improve secrecy capacity according to the basic principles of PLS. To facilitate the trajectory
design, the periodical flight duration is generally discretized into multiple short time slots and
mobile UAVs are approximately assumed static in each time slot. It is worth noting that the length
of each time slot should be carefully chosen since a short time slot will simultaneously lead to
high approximation accuracy of static UAVs and high complexity of the designing problems.
Combining with the positions and trajectories of UAVs, the power-domain DoFs should be
jointly optimized to further improve secrecy performance. The quality of both legitimate channels
and wiretap channels is time-variant during the flight period, which significantly affects the
transmit power design. Generally under different application scenarios of UAV-involved secure
communications, the purpose of transmit power design is to sufficiently make use of the channel
superiority of legitimate channels to improve the secrecy capacity or to increase the channel
superiority in an opportunistic manner.
Based on the aforementioned application scenarios and main design considerations, the recent
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
6	

	


 
Fig. 2. UAV aerial base stations to provide temporary secure communication services for the certain areas.
research efforts on both UAV-enabled secure communications and UAV-aided secure cooperation
are provided subsequently. After that, we will provide some valuable future research directions
according to the comprehensive analysis of the recent research efforts.
III. UAV-ENABLED SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we provide the recent research efforts on UAV-enabled secure communications.
Based on different roles of UAVs, the specific applications in this scenario can be separately
categorized as UAV aerial base stations and UAV aerial legitimate terminals, which will be
discussed in the following parts.
A. UAV Aerial Base Stations
Due to their high mobility, UAVs can be flexibly deployed as aerial base stations to provide
temporary communication services for a certain area, as depicted in Fig. 2. Due to the broadcast
nature of wireless transmissions and the dominating strong LoS channels, there exist severe
eavesdropping threats on secure transmissions. Based on the location information of legitimate
users and potential eavesdroppers, the on-demand mobility of UAVs can be exploited to simul-
taneously enhance the quality of legitimate channels and reduce the quality of wiretap channels
as much as possible, and thus improve secrecy performance.
The corresponding problem involving UAV aerial base stations was firstly investigated in [4].
Assuming that the position of the ground eavesdropper was available under LoS propagations, the
trajectory and transmit power of the UAV aerial base station were jointly optimized to maximize
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
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Fig. 3. The optimal trajectory designs of UAV aerial base station and the corresponding achievable secrecy rates against external
eavesdropper for different flight periods. The maximum speed of UAV is 5m/s and the reference signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at
the reference distance d0 = 1m is 80dB. The flying altitude of UAV is set as 50m.
the average achievable secrecy rate. Fig. 3 depicts the optimal UAV trajectory designs and the
corresponding achievable secrecy rates for different flight periods. It is observed that the flight
period is of great importance on the feasibility in designing an efficient trajectory. If the flight
period is sufficiently large, the optimal fly-hover-fly scheme is adopted where UAV aerial base
station always flies at the maximum speed to reach the optimal position and then hover (for
rotary-wing UAV without minimum flying speed limit) for better secrecy performance.
However, the actual locations of passive eavesdroppers are difficult to be accurately estimated
in practice. Therefore, how to deal with the position uncertainty becomes more challenging.
In [5], only the estimated locations of the ground eavesdroppers are available and their exact
locations were assumed in an area with a bounded estimation error. In this case, the authors jointly
optimized the trajectory and transmit power to maximize the average worst-case secrecy rate. To
effectively solve the non-convex optimization problem, S-procedure was introduced to deal with
the channel uncertainty problem, and the block coordinate descent method with successive convex
approximation (SCA) was exploited to iteratively obtain a sub-optimal solution. The proposed
robust transmission scheme is validated to significantly improve the secrecy performance in the
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8case of imperfect location estimation.
As for static UAV aerial base stations, the multi-antenna technology is potential to enhance
the superiority of equivalent legitimate channels by proper beamforming design. In [6], the
authors investigated millimeter wave (mmWave) secure transmissions in Nakagami-m fading
environment with mixed LoS/non-line-of-sight (NLoS) A2G channels, and the 3D antenna gains
of UAV aerial base stations were considered in a stochastic geometry framework. To incorporate
the UAV minimum separation distance requirements, the mate´rn hardcore process was used to
characterize the locations of UAV aerial base stations. In addition, part of random distributed
UAVs were further exploited as friendly jammer to improve the secrecy performance, and the
analytical expressions of the target user’s average secrecy rate were derived. It has been shown
that, though the achievable rates of both legitimate users and eavesdroppers increase with the
transmit power of UAV aerial base stations, there exists an optimal transmit power for maximizing
the average secrecy rate under certain conditions.
B. UAV Aerial Legitimate Terminals
Due to their flexible deployment and high mobility, UAVs have also been exploited as aerial
terminals to carry out some special tasks. Since UAV aerial terminals are practically operating
in an automatic manner under the control of associated GCSs via wireless links, their commu-
nication security is a critical issue and needs protection.
In [7], the authors discussed the ground-to-aerial (G2A) secure communications of the static
UAV legitimate terminal in the presence of a full-duplex ground eavesdropper, where the eaves-
dropper simultaneously performed eavesdropping and malicious jamming. For secrecy perfor-
mance enhancement, the null-space based artificial noise was exploited to reduce the quality of
wiretap channels. Under the condition that only the statistical channel state information (CSI)
of the eavesdropper was known, the hybrid outage probability combining both transmission
outage probability and secrecy outage probability (SOP) was derived. Based on the analytical
expressions, the optimal power allocation policy was obtained by a bisection search. The secrecy
performance could be improved by increasing the transmit power and/or equipping more transmit
antennas at the source. In addition, there exists an optimal operation height of the UAV aerial
legitimate terminal under different conditions according to simulation results.
To further take the mobility of UAVs into consideration, the authors in [8] investigated the
trajectory planning of the UAV aerial legitimate terminal against malicious jamming to enhance
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
9	
	











   

 
 


!"
 

 !#
$
%%

Fig. 4. UAV-enabled mobile relaying under the scenario where the ground direct transmission link is severely blocked by fading
and shadowing effect.
the quality of G2A secure communications. The positions and jamming powers of ground
attackers were assumed to be fixed during the flight period, and were empirically estimated
by the corresponding statistical values. Then, the 3D trajectory was optimized to maximize the
achievable throughput over the flight period, and SCA methods were exploited to overcome the
non-convexity of the optimization problem. Moreover, the closed-form solution of the optimized
3D deployment of the static UAV aerial legitimate terminal was geometrically derived, which
was an asymptotic case of the trajectory design with unlimited UAV speed. It is worth noting
that the optimal hovering position for the trajectory design is relatively close to the optimal
deployment of the UAV aerial legitimate terminal.
IV. UAV-AIDED SECURE COOPERATION
The recent research efforts on UAV-aided secure cooperation are provided in this section.
According to different roles of UAVs, the specific applications in this scenario can be separately
categorized as UAV-enabled mobile relaying and UAV-enabled friendly jamming, which will be
discussed in the following parts.
A. UAV-Enabled Mobile Relaying
According to the basic principles of PLS, cooperative relaying can be exploited to achieve
the superiority of legitimate channels to wiretap channels, which is critical to improve secrecy
capacity. However, the locations of traditional ground relay nodes are time-invariant, which
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
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makes it difficult for them to flexibly adapt to the dynamic environment. On the contrary, UAVs
can move close to the related nodes for secure communications due to their on-demand mobility
when serving as relay nodes, as depicted in Fig. 4. In such scenarios, the quality of legitimate
A2G channels can be enhanced while that of wiretap channels may be degraded due to their
distinct geometrical locations. As a result, UAV-enabled mobile relaying is promising to further
improve secrecy performance.
UAV-enabled mobile relaying was firstly investigated in [9] to maximize the average achievable
secrecy rate by optimizing the transmit power allocation among the flight period. Then, a similar
idea was extended in [10] to further include the joint design of dynamic UAV trajectory. It is
worth noting that decode-and-forward (DF) mode is adopted in the above works, where UAV
mobile relays are promising to approach GBSs for better decoding capability. However, due to
their limited velocity, the adopted DF-mode UAV relays are implicitly required equipping with a
large buffer to store the decoded messages, which causes significant transmission delay. Instead,
amplify-and-forward (AF) mode is an effective choice for UAV-enabled mobile relaying with less
processing complexity and transmission delay. Moreover, AF mode is appropriate for untrusted
relay scenarios to avoid additional secrecy issues. However, the mobility characteristics of UAVs
cannot be fully utilized since retransmission occurs at the adjacent time slot, and the amplified
background noise will lead to relative performance loss at high SNR regime compared with DF
mode. Above all, the best relaying mode can be different and is highly dependent on the specific
application scenario.
Under the scenario where there exist multiple mobile UAV relays, the authors in [11] investi-
gated the opportunistic relaying in the presence of multiple UAV eavesdroppers. Specifically, the
optimal UAV relay was chosen according to the principle of maximizing the end-to-end SNR,
which is observed as a random selection from the perspective of eavesdroppers. Considering the
wireless backhaul reliability from the GCS to the UAV-transmitter under Nakagami-m fading
conditions, the closed-form expression of SOP was then derived under the assumption that the
maximum ratio combining (MRC) was applied among multiple UAV eavesdroppers. However, the
significant mobility characteristic of UAV-enabled mobile relaying was not exploited in this work.
Except for relay selection, cooperative beamforming is another choice to enhance the quality of
equivalent legitimate channels to improve secrecy performance. To our best knowledge, related
work on this topic is still missing, which is an open issue for future researches.
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Fig. 5. UAV-enabled friendly jamming to transmit artificial noise against potential eavesdroppers in the certain area.
B. UAV-Enabled Friendly Jamming
Except for relaying the expected messages, UAV-enabled friendly jamming is another way to
cooperatively improve the security by transmitting artificial noise, as depicted in Fig. 5. Compared
with traditional ground jamming, UAVs are able to adjust their jamming power dynamically
according to their relative positions with legitimate users and potential eavesdroppers due to
their flexible deployment and high mobility. In addition, the dominant strong LoS A2G channels
are more beneficial for jamming. On one hand, the quality of wiretap channels is significantly
degraded since LoS A2G channels are less impaired by fading and shadowing effects compared
with ground jamming channels. On the other hand, the CSI of A2G jamming channels is easier
to obtain under LoS conditions since it is highly dependent on the relative distances between
UAV mobile jammers and ground eavesdroppers. Therefore, UAV-enabled friendly jamming is
potential for secrecy performance enhancement.
The basic idea of UAV-enabled friendly jamming was discussed in [12]. The average achievable
secrecy rate was maximized by jointly designing the trajectory and transmit power of an UAV
jammer. It is observed that the time-variant positions are determined by the flight period of UAV
mobile jammer, which has an important impact on the optimal design of UAV trajectory and
thus significantly affects secrecy performance. In addition, it is worth noting that an improper
jamming power design is even harmful to secrecy performance since the quality of legitimate
channels can be more severely degraded.
In practice, the exact locations of eavesdroppers are generally difficult to be perfectly estimated.
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
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The estimation error has a significant impact on the design of secure transmission schemes.
Taking this into consideration, a potential eavesdroppers’ target area model was established in
[13] for UAV-enabled friendly jamming scheme design. Based on different assumptions on A2G
channels, the mixed LoS/NLoS model was adopted to characterize the average path loss of
UAV jamming links. Then, the jamming coverage was determined by comparing the location-
dependent interception probability of the potential eavesdropper with a predetermined threshold.
Subject to the outage probability constraint of the legitimate user, the optimal 3D deployment of
the static UAV-enabled jammer was designed to maximize the jamming coverage. To facilitate
a tractable analysis, a large sample set of discrete eavesdropper locations and binary integer
variables were introduced to represent the target area and the jamming coverage, respectively.
To overcome the non-convexity of the problem, a sub-optimal solution in an alternating manner
was proposed by considering the multiple circles placement problem in each iteration. It is
worth noting that different definitions of the jamming coverage will lead to different design of
transmission schemes.
V. UAV-ENABLED HYBRID SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEME
Under the scenario involving multiple UAVs for secure communications, different UAVs can be
assigned different tasks to provide a hybrid transmission scheme. In [14], UAV-enabled friendly
jamming was exploited to assist secure communications between the UAV aerial base station
and multiple legitimate ground users. The time division multiple access (TDMA) protocol was
adopted that one legitimate user was scheduled in each time slot while other unscheduled users
were treated as potential eavesdroppers. In such a scenario, the worst-case average secrecy rate
among legitimate users was maximized and the optimization problem was solved in an alternating
iterative manner. In each iteration, the closed-form expressions of the user scheduling binary
integer variables were obtained given fixed transmit powers and trajectories of dual UAVs, and
then SCA methods were exploited to deal with the non-convexity of other sub-problems. In [15], a
similar idea was investigated in the presence of multiple external ground eavesdroppers. Given the
constant transmit power, the collision avoidance constraint was further taken into consideration
for the safety of dual UAVs. To deal with the non-convexity caused by the user scheduling binary
integer variables, the discrete binary user scheduling constraints were firstly transformed into
the equivalent equality constraints by introducing auxiliary continuous variables. The penalty
concave-convex procedure (P-CCCP) method was then exploited to solve the obtained problem
June 25, 2019 DRAFT
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by incorporating the corresponding penalty terms into the objective function in a double-loop
manner. It has been indicated that this design could be directly extended to the general scenarios
where there exist multiple UAV friendly jammers.
Compared with other transmission schemes with static friendly jammer or base station, fig.
6 validates the significant secrecy performance improvement brought by hybrid transmission
scheme, due to the mobility characteristics of UAVs. So far, the corresponding researches related
to UAV-enabled hybrid secure transmission are limited, which is still an open issue.
VI. RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, some open issues of research challenges and future directions on UAV-involved
secure wireless communications are highlighted.
To reduce the complexity of trajectory design, the existing works on this subject roughly
fall into two categories: static 3D deployment design under mixed LoS/NLoS conditions and
horizontal trajectory design with minimum allowable flight height to avoid collision under
dominant LoS scenarios. However, static UAV deployment design is an asymptotic case of
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dynamic trajectory design with unlimited velocity given predetermined initial and final locations
(e.g. for energy charge), and is unable to efficiently adapt to the dynamic environment. On
the other hand, dominant LoS scenarios is oversimplified and thus impractical, especially in
the suburban, urban and metropolitan areas. Therefore, probabilistic LoS/NLoS channels should
be accurately modeled to reflect the practical characteristics of different actual communication
environments. Moreover, the distribution of obstacles should be taken into consideration, leading
to the practical constraints to design optimal UAV 3D trajectory. In such a context, effective
approaches are urgently needed to overcome the high complexity introduced by practical channel
models and constraints as aforementioned.
Due to their cost-effective and payload-limited characteristics, multiple UAVs are promising
to collaboratively carry out complicated tasks in the future, which is expected to further enhance
secrecy performance of UAV-involved secure communications. However, there exist significant
variations among different secure communication scenarios, such as the wireless transmission
environment, the distribution of legitimate terminals and potential eavesdroppers/attackers, and
the security performance objective of concern, Therefore, the optimal configuration of multiple
UAVs can be totally different. In such a context, the jointly distributed processing of multi-
UAV secure communications combined with optimal configuration design of UAVs for each
specific scenario deserves further investigations. On the other hand, due to the scarcity of public
spectrum, some currently existing techniques, such as cognitive radio (CR) technology and non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) transmission scheme, are supposed to be introduced for
spectral efficiency enhancement of multi-UAV secure communications, and the resulted unique
security issues should also be taken into consideration.
With the rapid development of UAV manufacturing and antenna miniaturization, UAVs can
be equipped with a certain number of antennas in spite of their limited payload capacity. The
introduced spatial diversity gain can be exploited for beamforming design, so as to further
improve secrecy performance, especially for the low-altitude UAVs with probabilistic multi-path
NLoS transmissions. In addition, it is worth noting that the newly-introduced spatial DoFs by
multi-antenna technology effectively compensate for the location-dependent DoFs of UAVs, and
thus the trajectory design can be simplified under the scenarios where there are multiple related
practical constraints. Nevertheless, the performance of multi-antenna transmission depends on
preliminary accurate channel estimation results, which are rather difficult to obtain due to high
velocity of UAVs and need additional investigations.
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Due to limited power storage capability of UAVs, their related energy issues are particularly
critical. In such a context, one of the significant goals of UAV-involved secure communications is
to simultaneously improve secrecy and energy performances. Since the energy issues associated
with UAVs depend on their movement features, such as velocity and acceleration, the resulted
trajectory designs are quite complicated, and thus effective approaches are needed to deal with
the proposed problems. On the other hand, energy harvesting technology can also be exploited
to increase the endurance of UAVs by providing a wireless power supplement. Moreover, it is
worth noting that the transmitted energy-bearing signals are information-independent, which can
be equivalently designed as jamming signals to simultaneously degrade the quality of wiretapping
channels, and thus secrecy performance can be further improved.
Compared with traditional confidential transmissions, which prevent the target messages from
being successfully decoded by potential eavesdroppers, covert communications can essentially
improve secrecy performance with higher requirements. For UAV-involved covert communication
scenarios, the major requirement is to prevent the target messages from interception since
it is difficult to hide UAVs. Similar to traditional confidential transmissions, it is expected
that UAVs can play multiple roles in covert communications as aforementioned, however, the
corresponding research is still limited so far. Therefore, it is a potential research direction to
design the configuration of UAVs and optimize the transmit power and/or UAV trajectory for
covert communications.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have provided an overview of recent research efforts on UAV-involved
secure wireless communications. The typical application scenarios have been categorized as
UAV-enabled secure communications and UAV-aided secure cooperation according to different
roles of UAVs. Then, the main design considerations including 3D position design of static
UAVs, trajectory design of mobile UAVs, and transmit power design have been investigated
for secrecy performance enhancement. Finally, we have also provided some valuable research
directions on this topic. It is hoped that this overview will lead to more significant and practical
researches for UAV-involved secure wireless communications in the future.
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